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Beside Kofar Nassarawa, a gate to the mud wall that once ringed the Muslim heart of Kano, a city in northern Nigeria, there is a *mai gyara*, a mechanic who repairs scooters and motorbikes. On this atrophying wall in the 1990s there was a poster of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, a radical Islamic leader, and next to him one of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shia leader Zakzaky championed. No doubt the mechanic or one of his assistants was a fan of Zakzaky, a figure of some charisma among the Muslim youth of the North, but the fact that someone else had tried to tear off the poster of Khomeini registered the wider suspicion that Hausa Sunnis have for Shia worship. Once, while my Vespa was in a line waiting to be repaired, one of the assistants switched cassettes on an old tape player and started playing a *bandiri* tape. As he did so, one customer started to hum along, recognizing the Indian film tune on which the song was based, but not knowing the words of this Hausa variation. *Bandiri* singers are Hausa musicians who take Indian film tunes and change the words to sing songs praising the prophet Muhammad. This action sparked an immediate response from two customers who looked on with distaste—clearly uncomfortable at being subjected to this music while waiting for their bikes to be repaired. Their discomfort provoked a mild but clear debate splitting the mechanics and customers—all from the old city of Kano—into three discrete groups: those who wanted to hear the *bandiri* music; those, including the man humming along, who did not care one way or another, and the last two customers asking for the music to be stopped.

Knowing the controversy over *bandiri* music because of my research on Indian film in Nigeria, I found it interesting that two of the customers reacted not with anger but with a palpable sense of distaste, a sort of weary disappointment, as if the music, like cigarette smoke in a restaurant, was a repugnant physical presence being forced on them. It emphasized the ambivalent quality of a musical form such as *bandiri* that, with roots in a secular realm of entertainment, is also religious. It partakes of the elaborate Sufi tradition in which recitation of praises to the Prophet carry with them spiritual and sometimes magical benefits and sound has tangible properties beyond the aural. The distaste for *bandiri* may well have been motivated by a dislike of the migration of Indian films into Hausa popular culture.

But while one may not like Indian music, it does not make the same claims on one's spiritual well-being and mode of honoring God. It was the ability of *bandiri* to compromise its orthodox religious listeners by creating an unorthodox, Sufi environment that generated unease.

Singing live at public ceremonies such as weddings, or selling cassettes through local markets, *bandiri* singers are effecting a transformation from the profane to the sacred when they sing Hausa praise songs to Indian tunes. The popularity of the genre rests, however, on the common cultural competence of listeners who recognize their favorite Hindi film songs. By doing so, these listeners see through the mask, so to speak, as the profane original haunts the sacred copy. As suggested above, this is a contested phenomenon in a Muslim society undergoing an Islamist revival. Is it really Islamic, many Hausa Muslims ask, to use songs taken from sensual, un-Islamic origins for religious purposes? Moreover, the controversy over *bandiri* music is not just about Indian love songs. *Bandiri* is named after the drum—the *bandir*—used in ritual practice by Sufis to enter into trance. Is it really Islamic, many Hausa Muslims ask, to enter into trance, or to use drums inside the mosque, indeed to be Sufi in a world where Wahhabi belief moves provocatively across the Muslim world? *Bandiri* sits at the nexus of these very different sorts of transnational flows, Islamist revival and Indian popular culture that meet and make sense in northern Nigeria, in the context of a spatial configuration of culture, media, and religion.

### **Producing Urban Space in Africa**

Recent analyses of urban space in African studies and anthropology have stressed urban space as a crucible for the flow of cultural forms across borders.<sup>1</sup> The theoretical move here has been to argue that the West and non-West have mutually constituted each other in a structurally uneven, but nevertheless two-sided, process. This is clearly aimed at asserting the agency of African or Asian societies. That while the traffic in culture from the West is prominent in African societies, as Jean-Francois Bayart remarks, this is always an act of reinvention and appropriation.<sup>2</sup> Manthia Diawara has examined the ambivalences of Malian youths copying African American culture heroes in a socialist state wary of what they saw as colonialist mimicry.<sup>3</sup> James Ferguson has recently persuasively argued that we ought to examine the nature of urban (and rural) identities in Africa as modes of cultural style: poles of signification that people can move between depending on wealth, education, and cultural competence.<sup>4</sup> Ferguson is mobilizing an idea of urban space as defined by a syntagmatic chain of difference. *Rural* or *urban* or *local* or *cosmopolitan* are not temporally

distinct states of being in which one evolves into another, but rather are produced in relation to each other within the same social field. Urban life, as represented here, is the matter of choosing between differing stylistic modes: whether to speak a European language or an African one; whether to dress in traditional clothes, in the bureaucratic attire of suits and ties, in baggy jeans and football shirts, or in the *hijab*. The danger here is that the urban is defined as an arena in which freely flowing symbolic forms clash and compete, but the issue of how these forms arrived in the first place is not addressed.

Ferguson is well aware of this danger and warns against it, though his central aim is not to analyze the political-economic context out of which cultural forms emerge. Rather, for the Copperbelt urban dwellers he examines, Western clothing, Congolese rumba, South African theater, and West Indian reggae comprise the established forms of urban space out of which cultural style is fashioned. By probing into the background of this space—how it comes to be organized in the way that it does—my aim is to unite this concern for hybrid cultural exchanges with a sense of the material underpinnings that make those exchanges possible.

If the city is an event, as Georg Simmel has argued, and urban experience the outcome of a ceaseless series of encounters, then those encounters in this city are constituted within the limits of the networks that bump up against each other there. Sufi religious brotherhoods, Lebanese businessmen, Ibo traders, and Hausa politicians are based in Kano but embedded in their own discrete networks that extend in different directions worldwide. Space in this account is not something that is simply there but, as Henri Lefebvre argues, is something that is the outcome of capitalist relations of exchange, and those relations create the peculiar sets of networks that exist in any particular urban place.<sup>5</sup> For the movement of cultural goods to occur—be they Indian films, hip-hop from the United States, or high fashion from Europe and Japan—a formal and informal infrastructure has to be established creating the material channels for those transnational cultural flows. These infrastructures connect certain points in a network, ranking and separating one place from another, enabling the possibility of certain connections while foreclosing other linkages. “Flows,” for all their seemingly disembodied nature, require material conduits, and they appear because a place—in this case urban Kano—is embedded in precise networks of social relations built over time.

Infrastructures are the material forms that bind and knit urban spaces into these wider sets—forcing us to think of space not in terms of discrete buildings or isolated moments on a landscape but as networked amalgams of built space. The connecting tissues of cables, roads, rail, and air replicate the Enlightenment ideal of infrastructure as the nervous system of society

facilitating the unfettered circulation of goods, ideas, and people out of which the rationally ordered state could be born.<sup>6</sup> Urban infrastructure networks provide the base for the operation of modern economic and social systems, linking firms, organization, and individuals into wider economic and social structures.<sup>7</sup> It is about mobility—the movement of commodities, whether waste, energy, or information—bringing diverse places into interaction, connecting some while divorcing others, constantly ranking, connecting, segmenting spaces and people.

Successive regimes of capital destroy and rebuild infrastructures, reconfiguring space in their own image.<sup>8</sup> By building shipping lines, warehouses, roads, railways, workers' quarters, telephone lines, and fiber optic cables, these infrastructures not only organize the flow of exchange and the sets of cultural, religious, and economic networks with which the city interacts, but they physically shape the city. Lefebvre argues that as space is continually reformed by the necessities of capital, newly developed networks do not eradicate earlier ones but are superimposed on top of them, creating a historical layering. As he memorably puts it, this makes space seem like the flakiness of a mille-feuille pastry rather than homogeneous and discrete.<sup>9</sup> At any one point, then, urban space is made up of layers of networks connected by infrastructures. These conduits dictate which flows of religious and cultural ideas move and therefore which social relations get mobilized in their wake. Their layering helps explain why dormant cultural, religious, and economic forms can suddenly gain purchase again, be reawakened and reenergized in a new situation.<sup>10</sup>

Urban spaces such as Kano can usefully be seen as assemblages of different sets that connect Hausa to other networks. I am loosely using the mathematical definition of a set as the combination of different elements interlinked to form a totality. Infrastructures—both material and immaterial—are the connecting tissues that bind these elements to the whole. They are material in the obvious sense of the construction of air routes, railways, or mobile phone networks that join one place to another. They are immaterial in that they require linguistic competencies, professional expertise, educational styles, and cultural philosophies that facilitate the exchange of information and goods across cultural boundaries. Islam, for instance, is one such set, integrating Kano Muslims into a wider totality of the Muslim *umma* through shared religious practice, pilgrimages, education, Sufi adherence, and so on. Islam itself can be broken down into multiple subsets, only some of which Hausa are involved in. When we refer to the “urban experience,” partly what we are referring to is the assemblage of sets that forms the unique configuration of a city. These are layered over time, and the introduction of new layers interacts with existing ones, reenergizing some while closing off others. This evolution orients Kano

internally toward southern Nigeria but also across the Sahara to North Africa and the Middle East, across the Atlantic and increasingly over the Indian Ocean to Asia.<sup>11</sup> Northerners chase modernity through Muslim connections to Saudi Arabia, Dubai, and other Islamic centers, as well as through connections to the West. All this makes Kano integrated yet distinct from its sister cities in the south, and it is out of this Kano-based configuration of Islamic and Western modernity that the unlikely synthesis of *bandiri* music, with its roots in Sufi worship and Hindi lovemaking, is possible.

### **Set One: The Lovers of the Prophet**

In 1996 I was taken by the *bandiri* singer Lawan ‘Dan Yaro Magashi to a *bandiri* performance in the Magashi quarters of the old city (*birni*) of Kano. Magashi is an area in the old city of Kano, for Muslims the traditional moral heart where Islamic values and lifestyles are maintained.<sup>12</sup> It is an overwhelmingly Sufi area, predominantly Tijaniyya but with a large and powerful minority of Qadiriyya followers.<sup>13</sup> Outside a house where a naming ceremony was being performed, the musicians had tied loudspeakers to the walls across the narrow alleyway. The singer held the microphone and sang Hausa words to Indian film tunes; behind him, four youths sang back in response, each of them beating the *bandir*, the large, black tambourine-like drum from North Africa. In front of them all were another seven or so youths dancing a Sufi dance, punching their arms back and forth in time to the music. In the doorways young girls listened, laughing, their bodies covered in brightly colored prints and their heads encased by large scarves, while the alleys around were packed with a mob of boys listening, shouting, and sometimes singing to the song being played. Older men looked on, somewhat skeptically, from a distance. As the song finished, another youth took the place of the singer, pitting his skill at lyric writing and singing against the one who came before (and another who would come after).

In a way, *bandiri* could only have emerged in areas like this in Kano, or similar areas in sister Sufi cities in the north such as Sokoto and Zaria.<sup>14</sup> Kano was one of the urban areas where Indian films first were shown in the 1950s, and today it remains the distribution center for pirate video and music cassettes of Indian films (the main way they circulate in the north). In the second half of the twentieth century it has been a font for the introduction of new modes of Islamic education paving the way for the emergence of a cadre of modernist religious scholars that have gone on to lead new anti-Sufi Islamist movements. But most of all it has been a

dominant center of Sufi learning and for nearly a century has been known as the preeminent base of Tijaniyya Sufi affiliation in Nigeria.

*Bandiri* music developed from the religious use of the *bandir* drum by Qadiriyya Sufi adepts. Every evening in Kano, Qadiriyya Sufis gather at certain mosques for the public performance of the *dhikr*, the ritual that uses the *bandir* drum to regulate the speed of chanting litanies. Roman Loimeier highlights the importance of repetition “where through the constant chanting of a short phrase like Allah Allah . . . the participants breathe in or against the rhythm of their chanting,” leading to the invoking of trancelike states.<sup>15</sup> This is a public phenomenon and arose in the late 1950s as part of the effort by the Qadiriyya sheikh, Nasiru Kabara, to turn Sufi practice from an elite, secret movement into a mass phenomenon, and in Kano the *bandir-dhikr* has become a public spectacle of Qadiriyya affiliation. Loimeier sees the regular public ritual of *bandir* drumming as a crucial spectacle whereby “the presence of the tariqâ [Sufi order] in the city is underlined not only visually but also acoustically from day to day and night to night.”<sup>16</sup>

As a musical practice, *bandiri* derives significance from this ritual use but is different in key ways. For the most part it is played at events such as wedding parties and naming ceremonies, which have both a religious and a nonreligious dimension.<sup>17</sup> Oftentimes different singers gather together with the same backing group. They take a particular Indian film, such as *Kabhi Kabhie (Love Is Life)*, dir. Yash Chopra, 1976) and divide up the songs between them, each one responsible for translating a different song from the film into a Hausa praise song. Then during the performance the singers take turns competing with one another for the best performance. There is a tremendous excitement to this, in the energy of the dancing, the sound of the drums, and the reaction of the crowd gathered around. While the audience is mostly young, certain songs are chosen from 1950s and 1960s Indian films to appeal to older viewers. Both performers and audience see *bandiri* as a religious form, but it clearly borders on many of the activities and genres of secular music.

*Bandiri* originated in the practice of youths studying at Islamiyya schools, the new schools in Nigeria that teach Islam in a Western educational style. Students at these schools got together to sing songs in Hausa on how to obey parents, or translated short hadith (the record of the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad) and turned them into songs, or simply sang praises to the Prophet. The first songs were religious versions of popular songs by Hausa musicians such as Mamman Shata or ‘Dan Kwairo, and after a while youths began to adapt Indian film songs (it was and remains common for Hausa youth to sing Indian film songs in school). Their aim was revivalist, to introduce a more religious dimension

to popular activities such as wedding parties and naming ceremonies and to attract youth back to religious contemplation through popular mass culture.

In the late eighties, as *bandiri* began to take off in popularity, societies such as Kungiyar Yabon Manzon Allah (Society for Praising the Messenger of God) and Kungiyar Ushaq'u Indiya (Society for the Lovers of India) were created to formalize the coming together of young Hausa singers performing *bandiri* music. *Ushaq'u* is an Arabic word meaning a passionate or ardent lover and is derived from *'ishq*—passion or yearning. In Hausa (as opposed to Arabic) the word is associated with a religious register in contrast to the more familiar term for romantic love, *so*. As one singer explained to me, *'ishq*, in the Hausa usage at least, refers to the deepest possible love.<sup>18</sup> While singers do sell cassettes, *bandiri* is still primarily a live performance genre. Groups are sponsored by individuals to perform at specific ceremonies, and they often try to translate their prestige from *bandiri* performance into a patron-client relation with prominent Sufi *malams* (religious teachers).<sup>19</sup> As *bandiri* gained in popularity, singers started to sell cassettes through specialist dealers at the market. The first tapes were compilations of different *bandiri* singers; they were grouped under the heading of the Society of Ushaq'u singers and labeled “Ushaq'u Indiya 1,” “Ushaq'u Indiya 2,” and so on.<sup>20</sup> The tapes themselves contain an opening prayer and a brief introduction to the singers. Some tapes address the audience as “My brothers, Lovers of the Messenger of Allah (S.A.W.),” implicitly constructing the audience as fellow Sufi members (likely to be the case) and reasserting the religious intention of the music.

## Set Two: The Rise of Anti-Sufism

*Bandiri* music grew and developed in an arena of overt conflict. Those who perform *bandiri* realize this is a controversial activity and that, as one told me, “You know religion in our country, one man’s meat is another man’s poison.” While many people are for it, others are bitterly opposed. This conflict does not just derive from the software of *bandiri* (the songs and the borrowing of them from Indian films) but the hardware itself (the use of the *bandir* drum) and its position as a symbol of Sufi adherence. The identification of *bandiri* with Sufism has made it deeply controversial in Nigeria, piggybacking onto the wider religious conflict that has pitted established Sufi orders against the rise of a new Islamist movement—Izala—and its intellectual leader, Abubakar Gumi.<sup>21</sup>

The rise of Gumi is significant because he represents the shift to a new configuration of Hausa economy, politics, and society. Gumi was one of

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the first Islamic scholars to be educated by the British within the colonial education system and certainly the first major religious leader to come to prominence through his participation in the colonial and postcolonial bureaucracy. Before him Sufi scholars were linked to aristocratic elites and to old trading families who were deeply suspicious of Western education and the *boko* (Western) lifestyle. Gumi's support network was different. It relied on his alliances within the postcolonial bureaucracy and his close relations with elected politicians, military figures, and bureaucrats. And for Gumi it was precisely his bureaucratic colonial links—as a scholarship student to the Sudan and as Nigerian Pilgrims Officer to Saudi Arabia—that Gumi began to travel widely within the Muslim world. Gumi was especially known for his close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one that began with his stint as Pilgrims Officer but was cemented by his role as religious leader to the Sardauna of Sokoto, the premier of the northern region of Nigeria at independence. Gumi adopted the legalistic, anti-Sufi brand of Islamic belief prominent in Saudi Wahhabism, and it was this that he brought back to Nigeria.

In the early 1970s Gumi began to outline a critique of Sufism in a variety of forums, from *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis) at the mosque, to newspaper articles, to radio broadcasts. This critique followed orthodox Wahhabi lines: he attacked Sufism as an innovation (*bid'a*) in Islamic practice in a religion where innovation in matters of faith was not allowed; he criticized the veneration of Sufi saints and the practice of Sufi orders. In its stead, he argued for a return to the key texts of Islam—the Koran and the hadith—texts available to everyone through education and reason. In 1972 his critique was centralized into a book, *The Right Belief Is Based on the Sharia*, which caused an uproar in Nigeria.<sup>22</sup> Gumi's strategy was to take central ritual symbols of the prominent Sufi orders in Nigeria—the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya—and to argue that they ran contrary to the teachings of the Koran. In the case of Qadiriyya, the tactic was to take on a central ritual of the order—the use of the *bandir* drum in the mosque—and to argue that it was an illegal innovation. Most shockingly, he did so in sharp, inflammatory language claiming that “those who combine drumming with religion . . . reduce their religion to a plaything. . . . They will taste the punishment which they disbelieve.”<sup>23</sup>

The effect of this attack was electric. The history of Islam in Nigeria has been rent with religious conflict, but until this point it had always been conflict within and between Sufi orders. Gumi was now claiming that all Sufis were “imposters in Islam,” sparking an intense backlash that spilled over into armed conflict between followers of the different camps.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, the use of the *bandir* was defended by Nasiru Kabara, the Qadiriyya sheikh with whom the practice was most identified. Gumi's attack

and Kabara's defense meant that the use of the *bandir* drum came to be a defining symbol of Sufi belief or deviance: something to be championed or rejected, but never ignored.

It is no accident that the use of *bandiri* music, with its evangelical goal of using popular Hausa songs and Indian film tunes to bring youths back to religious practice, arose at a time when Sufi practice itself was under unprecedented assault from a Wahhabi-inspired anti-Sufi movement. The activity of singing praise songs, even of calling the singers "lovers of the Prophet," is an implicit attack on the condemnation of praise singing by the transnational spread of orthodox Wahhabi ideas to Nigeria. These themes are often explicitly dealt with in the songs themselves when singers assert their right to praise the Prophet despite "whoever is against him," a dark warning neatly conflating non-Muslims with followers of Izala, the movement led by Abubakar Gumi.<sup>25</sup> The background of Sufi-Izala conflict provides the cultural and religious reason why Indian film music was taken up—in this way and at this time. By drawing on the massive popularity of the film style and already existing practices of singing Hindi film songs, Sufi followers managed to establish a powerful and popular new music genre whose significance lies in the layering of social relations and space: the position of Kano as the node of two different circuits of cultural and religious flows: one reaching out across the Sahara to Saudi Arabia and the other across the Indian Ocean to India.

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### Set Three: Indian Films in Kano

Indian music saturates the popular culture of northern Nigeria, creating a landscape of desire and spectacle and a field for nostalgia and memory. *Bandiri* taps into these emotions, creating an intertextual play with romance and devotion; charisma and stardom; traditional culture and modernity. It is a form of mimicking whereby the "copy" draws from the power and symbolic richness of the original but only at the cost of raising questions of cultural authenticity and cultural erosion. The tunes that *bandiri* singers borrow bring with them memories and tastes of the original context of reception. A song about the love of followers for the prophet Muhammad is shadowed by an image of Salman Khan doing push-ups in the film *Maine Pyar Kiya* (*I Have Fallen in Love*, dir. Sooraj R. Barjatya, 1989), and other songs are haunted by the actors and actresses symbolically superimposed over every song of praise. Nigerian Sufi followers resignify this music into devotional songs, siphoning and transforming charisma from one context to another. *Bandiri* thus relies on a dialectic of similarity and difference. The copy has to be similar enough to the original to be recognized, to

recoup the profits of mimesis, but yet it has to be transformed, religiously and culturally. Its original context must be obliterated at the same time as it is invoked, in order to take on sacred meaning. This is the aura that local Hausa singers bring to a devotional tradition of praise singing with a long, elaborate history. While redefining Indian films in a Hausa context, then, they are redefining Sufi praise music in terms of its association with the glamorous modernity of Indian films. And they project, through mimicry, Hausa popular culture into the prestigious and alluring world of global cultural flows.

Hausa nostalgia for Indian films derives from their long historical popularity dating back to the 1950s, which has imprinted generations of northern Nigerians with the songs, narratives, and stars of Indian film.<sup>26</sup> What is striking about this engagement is that unlike East Africa, where Indian films followed the substantial numbers of diasporic Indians in West Africa, the circulation of Indian film and music is based wholly on a Nigerian market (one in which the South Asian population is relatively insignificant). This makes for a sharp distinction between the two areas, as Hausa identification with the narratives and desires of Indian films is possible precisely because of the separation of the audience from the cultures they are imagining. This is not possible for non-Indian Kenyans or Ugandans, whose viewing practices take place in a much more economically, sexually, and ethnically charged social space where Indians and Africans intermix.<sup>27</sup> In northern Nigeria, Indian films benefit from a perceived similarity and a strong identification Hausa have with India based on cultural practice, moral ethics, and linguistic similarity. Many Hausa, for instance, argue that Hausa and Hindi are descended from the same language—an argument also voiced to me by an Indian importer of films to account for their popularity. While wrong in terms of linguistic evolution, this argument acknowledges the substantial presence of Arabic and English loanwords in both languages, a key factor in creating this perceived sense of similarity and which helps many Hausa “speak Hindi.” Hausa and Indians have also been linked through the common denominator of the British Empire, and it is interesting to speculate on the mediating presence that empire had in creating a sense of commonality that helps account for the popularity of Indian films.<sup>28</sup> All this feeds into the cultural background of the Indian postcolony and explains part of the identification of Hausa audiences with Indian culture in the common historical experience of British Empire and the perceived tension between traditional culture and a modernizing Western one.

The powerful sense of identification between the two cultures is also explained in terms of Bollywood’s alterity from American and British film and television and its depiction of moral problems that are simply absent

from most Western media.<sup>29</sup> This was brought over to me in a discussion about the film *Maine Pyar Kiya* with Salman Khan, a huge hit in Nigeria as elsewhere. My male friend identified powerfully with the film's central tension—Khan's father forbidding his son permission to marry a poor girl and attempting to force him to marry the rich daughter of a business friend. The overt sentimentality was not seen in terms of fantasy but as something that emerges out of the historical experience of common people—a historical experience common to Nigeria and India. As my friend commented, "So the film is educative in fact. I have never watched an Indian film very interesting like this one. Because I shed tears, tears in watching the film . . . though knowing the film is fiction but I still shed tears, because it just showed a real dedication to what is happening in the world."<sup>30</sup> This comment is common in northern Nigeria, where people see Indian films as representing real, everyday problems and not in terms of kitsch fantasy with which they are greeted in the West. Bashir made this explicit: "American films are based mainly on . . . either action, war or just a show, like documentaries, so that is it. But Indian films on the other side, they base their films on their problems and on the problems of the masses, their masses. Anyway I don't watch much American films."<sup>31</sup>

When Hausa refer to Indian films being "just like" Hausa culture (a sentiment echoed here by Bashir) they actually mean the films are *more like* Hausa culture than the other two dominant mass cultural fields Hausa engage in—southern Nigerian and American media. Indian films are much more sexually demure than American films, but they are far more transgressive than everyday Hausa culture and as much as they reflect problems inherent to that society, they are a potentially threatening and destabilizing force. The tension between like and unlike, similarity and distance, is key to the appeal of transnational cultural forms, as it allows imaginative play that is tolerated precisely because it is different. Hausa can watch Indian films and appreciate their similarities, and the differences can be easily downplayed. This has been recently dramatized by the rise of a Hausa video film industry in the late 1990s. Unlike their southern counterparts, Hausa filmmakers have explicitly borrowed from Indian films, moving away from themes of magic, witchcraft, corruption, and money that mark southern Nigerian videos and emphasizing instead the theme of love. The similarity of Hausa videos to Indian films is most marked by the song and dance sequences between the actor and actress, which borrow heavily from Indian films. These sequences follow the generic conventions of Indian films as proxies for physical love; they usually take place between the main star and his or her lover; they take place in areas of picturesque natural beauty; and they involve frequent costume changes within the same song sequence. While massively popular, these sequences have caused huge

controversy in Hausa society for initiating what is seen as an un-Islamic and an un-Hausa mode of courtship into Hausa film. In the wake of the introduction of sharia law in 2001 and in response to the public outcry, the making of these Hausa videos was banned in Kano state (the prime site of production). Later the ban was eased so that filmmaking could continue as long as the song sequences did not include sexual intermixing. Interestingly enough, during this controversy the new Islamic state saw no need to ban Indian films, nor did the new censorship board censor Indian films, which continue to be popular. The tension arose when styles of love and sexual interaction from Indian films were dramatized in a Hausa context. What could be tolerated while safely confined to the practices of another culture however similar to Hausa culture was simply too controversial when the necessary gap for cultural borrowing was collapsed. Indian films are less explicit than recent southern Nigerian videos, but they are still sexually transgressive for an orthodox Islamic society, and like all cultural flows the popularity of Indian film depends on the maintenance of a safe distance, a stable alterity, the lack of which can be threatening.

### ***Bandiri***

*Bandiri* emerges out of the long Sufi tradition of singing praise songs to the prophet Muhammad. Like many forms of Sufism, erotics becomes a language of address whereby mystical arousal is linked to emotional arousal.<sup>32</sup> At the highest levels trance can be used to provoke mystical love culminating in ecstasy whereby the person possessed can mystically communicate with God or the Prophet. In *bandiri*, Muhammad is often the focus of intense love and longing, and *bandiri* singers (and Sufi adepts) refer to themselves as “lovers of the Prophet,” the emotional excessive realm of secular love being used to convey quite different but equally emotional parameters of religious love. Take this example sung by Sidi Musa and adapted from the film *Geet Gaata Chal (Let’s Walk and Sing)* (dir. Hiren Nag, 1975):

Singer: My heart is longing for you, my soul loves you, me, I am longing for my messenger, the Prophet of God.

Answer: My messenger the Prophet of God.

S: My heart is longing for you, my soul loves you, me, I am longing for my messenger, the Prophet of God.

A: My messenger the Prophet of God.

S: Owo, You are the one I am longing for Mustapha na Sayyadi. You are the one longing for Habibi, Prophet of God.

A: Habibi, Prophet of God.

S: I am longing . . . O . . . I am continuously longing for you. I am longing more and more.

A: O Mohammad Prophet of God, O my lover.<sup>33</sup>

In this Hausa song the vaulting strings of Indian film songs are absent, as is the Western and Indian instrumentation, leaving only the beating of the drum. Where the original film song is based on a duet between a man and a woman each singing verses in turn, Sidi Musa uses the more familiar African form of call and response played out between him and his backing singers. What is shared between Musa's song and the original is the melody and the sense of emotional excess, with Sufi followers using the ecstatic enactments of love in Indian films and stripping them of their secular trappings. *Bandiri* creates a play of similarity and difference, like and dislike, profane and sacred. We can see this process at work better by examining a Hausa version of the song "Jumma Chumma De De" from the film *Hum* (*Us*, dir. Mukul Anand, 1991).

In an Indian shipyard warehouse, a petty rogue, Tiger, dances with his docker friends singing to his girlfriend demanding that she give him a kiss. Jumma refuses as she sashays across a platform above them, raising her long red flamenco dress and revealing her black stockinged legs while her breast heaves in and out. Tiger and his friends dance in choreographed ecstasy, their pelvises thrusting back and forth. Finally, Tiger, impatient with her denials, picks up a hose large enough to represent the symbolic ejaculation of the dockers and drenches Jumma, tearing off her dress, knocking her from her platform into the midst of the gyrating men below. The distance between them collapsed, she dances with the men, her body wet and uncovered. Still she refuses to kiss her lover, maintaining the teasing distance between them until finally she and Tiger are engulfed by the dancing men and when Tiger emerges his face is covered with the bright red marks of her lipstick. "Jumma Chumma De De" was a song that was adapted from Hindi by the prominent *bandiri* singer Lawan 'Dan Yaro Magashi and reworked into the Hausa song "Zuma, Zumar Bege."

The skill here lies not just in copying the Indian tune or the quality of the singing, but also in the cleverness with which 'Dan Yaro chooses Hausa words that closely mirror the original Hindi. "Jumma chumma de de, jumma" ("Jumma, give me, give me a kiss") becomes "Zuma zumar bege mu sha" ("honey, honey we are longing to drink"). Similarly, the line "Jumme ke din kiyaa chumma kaa vaadaa" ("On a Friday, you had promised me a kiss") is transformed into "Zumar yabo ta gurin dan Amina" ("impressed honey, with the son of Amina"). The purpose of *bandiri* music is to strip the Indian song of its original lyrics, thus symbolically divorcing

it from its original filmic context. Here that context is a song sequence famous within Indian films for its raunchiness. Amitabh Bachchan plays a docker and Kimi Katkar the object of his desire. The sequence opens with Katkar parading down a runway above a band of seething dockers alternately raising and lowering her red flamenco dress. The wide shots of the group are intercut with medium close-ups of Tiger (Bachchan) and his cronies thrusting their pelvises in and out. Here the Indian film plays with the boundaries of the gendered moral universe of Indian films. As Sunita Mukhi points out, Katkar repeatedly says “no no” to Bachchan while her actions mime “yes yes.” It is striking that a song with such a sexualized origin could be seen as fodder for religious meditation, but this is part of the ambiguous place Indian films play in the landscape of northern Nigerian culture.

### Remembering and Forgetting

As much as *bandiri* rests on the dialectic of similarity and difference, it intimately engages remembering and forgetting. For copying to be successful, the original tune has to be recognized and the Hausa lyrics tied physically to the Hindi originals. But every moment of copying carries with it the anxiety produced by the immoral origins of the song. This immorality is heightened when we consider the ambivalent place of cinema within the conservative social arena of northern Nigeria. There cinemas used to be largely all-male places; the few women who did attend were seen as prostitutes, and sexual desire was to be found both on and off the screen. Since the introduction of Islamic law in 2001, women have been formally banned from these arenas, and strict sexual segregation is enforced. It is in this context that Indian films, the aura of relative sexual freedom they display, and the teasing independence of actresses (shown well in Katkar’s flirtation with Bachchan) gain sexual and moral purchase. Indian actresses are often seen as quintessential prostitutes not because they are immoral but because their deportment and relative freedom in interacting with men, their sexual freedom, and their glamour are all attributes associated with *karuwai* (prostitutes) in Nigeria. It is not uncommon that important female and male homosexual prostitutes in Kano name themselves after favorite film actresses, playing with these identities and borrowing from the aura of Indian stardom in a way analogous to *bandiri* music but morally inverting its use. In the context of Hausa society, then, Indian films can be sexually transgressive, as their erotic display, their sexual intermixing, and the use of music for carnal and not religious purposes combine to keep them beyond the pale of orthodox Islam. For *bandiri* singers it is necessary

to evoke these origins to set in motion the power of nostalgia and affect at the same time as they must be rejected in order for the transformation from secular to sacred to occur. This action is often addressed in the songs themselves, as in this example from Sidi Musa's song from *Geet Gaata Chal* cited above:

- S: My heart is longing for you my soul loves you. I am longing for my messenger the Prophet of God.  
A: My messenger the Prophet of God.  
S: Oh, whenever I start translating an Indian song leave me this work and I shall finish it.  
A: Ai, you are the one to finish it.  
S: Those who are longing for women should stop it. They should long for my Messenger the Prophet of God.  
A: My Messenger the prophet of God.  
S: Those who are longing for women should stop it. They should long for my Messenger the Prophet of God.  
A: My Messenger the prophet of God.  
S: We should forget about Indian songs, they are useless.  
A: They are useless.  
S: I am saying, in Indian songs I heard them singing Geet Gaata Chal, but I am singing the Prophet of God.  
A: The Greatest.  
A: O Muhammad, Prophet of God, O my lover.  
S: Sidi Musa, son of Sidi, I am the one who composed this Praising of the Prophet of God.

Here you get a prime instance of how the original context is rejected in the moment of its mimesis. The association of songs and longing for women sets up the un-Islamic nature of Indian song—*ba shi da amfani*—it is useless. But at the same time the song carries the intense emotions familiar from Indian films. As in Western musicals, songs in Indian films are often timed to appear as proxies for powerful feelings characters cannot convey in everyday conversation. *Bandiri* singers wish to maintain that intensity of emotion, to copy it, but then to divorce it from its original context, leaving only a heightened state of being.

Mimicry, then, lies at the heart of the social meaning of *bandiri* music. Michael Taussig argues that “the power of mimesis lies in the copy drawing on the character and power of the original, to the point whereby the representation may even assume that character and power.”<sup>34</sup> What is occurring here is a siphoning of charisma, as Sufis are harnessing the glamour and transnational prestige associated with Indian films to the quite different charisma of religious devotion.<sup>35</sup> But in this case, *bandiri* can only be successful if the meanings generated through mimicry can

be limited. Whether this can be completely achieved is an open question. Certainly, older Hausa and non-Sufis who look down on *bandiri* music and some who criticize it fiercely believe that the shadow of its original filmic performance haunts the reproduction, undermining it and making it either detrimental to Hausa culture (because of foreign borrowing) or un-Islamic, depending on one's point of view. Peter Manuel observes the same tension in the performance of parodies in the Indian context, especially devotional ones where "the borrowed melodies may remind listeners of the specific cinematic scenes in which they were picturized" and that these "extra-musical" associations can never be divorced, and perhaps threaten to overwhelm the transformed meaning of the copy.<sup>36</sup>

This suggests the difficulty, mentioned above, of being able to keep at length the filmic origins of particular songs to the degree necessary to make them sacred and no longer profane. Lawan 'Dan Yaro Magashi explained to me that he always sings "classic" songs from older films because it takes the senior generation by surprise when they recognize a song from their youth. He explicitly depends on evoking that original context and talked of how people come up and say, "I remember seeing that song in . . .," indexing the original moment of reception and drawing on it to give the Sufi version emotional resonance and meaning. In the different context of India, Sudhir Kakar has written about the important ways the common cultural competence of youths immersed in Indian films (or any other sort of films), such as my Hausa friend above, creates a common memory that provides a field of nostalgia later in life.<sup>37</sup> Writing of himself, Kakar recalled his early childhood sexual pleasure at watching wet sari scenes. When he recently saw such a scene, he said, "I felt grateful to the world of Hindi movies for providing continuity in an unstable and changing world. . . . When I was a child, the movies brought the vistas of a desirable adulthood tantalizingly close; as an adult, I find they help to keep the road to childhood open."<sup>38</sup> Remembering and forgetting, mimesis and alterity are the oppositions that provide the productive tensions making *bandiri* work.

### **Indian Songs, Copies, Originals, and Copies Again**

If *bandiri* music is a copy, it brings up the question of what is the original of which it is a copy? This can be a significant question in the case of Indian film songs, which, as many observers point out, are nothing if not rapacious in culling melodies and rhythms from religious, folk, and popular musics of the world. One famous source of Hindi film songs, for instance, are *qawwalis*, the rhythmic chanting, drumming, and clapping performed by Sufi followers in India and Pakistan, intended to stimulate

intense emotions.<sup>39</sup> From the inception of Indian cinema, *qawwali* was subsumed to the secular needs of the new medium. Instrumentation was made more diverse, emotional intensity was retained, but the focus was shifted to include romance as well as religion. Regula Burckhardt Qureshi points out that over time there has been a feedback loop between live *qawwali* performances and filmic *qawwalis*. Film music has borrowed heavily from the religious genre, but then the transformations it has introduced have fed back into live *qawwali* performances. Moving across space to northern Nigeria, Hausa Sufi followers, unaware of the Sufi roots to some of the songs they listen to, nevertheless recognize the emotional intensity (that first attracted music directors to *qawwali*) and re-resignify that emotional ecstasy back into an “original” Sufi context. Which one is the copy? In the case of “Jumma Chumma De De” this is all the more byzantine in that, unknown to Lawan ‘Dan Yaro Magashi, the Hausa singer of “Zuma Zumar Bege,” “Jumma Chumma De De” is itself an adaptation of “Yeke Yeke,” a West African song by the singer Mory Kante.

## Conclusion

The exaggerations of Indian film tack along the thin line between despair and ecstasy, populated by antiheroes filled with an outraged sense of injustice at the world (articulable only through violence); lovers oscillating wildly between passion and the agony of forbidden relationships; and families that impose the greatest burdens, the major betrayals, the deepest motivations for living. This is a melodrama of excess that articulates the anxieties of existence and provides a cultural matrix through which everyday economic, social, familial, and personal insecurities can be articulated. For Hausa viewers the reason that Indian films are so real is not in opposition to this melodrama but precisely because they swing so wildly between the heights and depths of lives in situations that are deeply ambivalent. In Nigeria it is the ability to moralize political economy<sup>40</sup> and to provide existential articulations of living that makes Indian films resonate with other articulations of insecurity—Pentecostalism, witchcraft, Wahhabi Islam—but without those networks’ means of tying these cultural expressions to real material networks of support. *Bandiri* music depends on this trafficking in an affective economy of meaning, nostalgia, and identification and is one of a host of cultural forms whereby Hausa reimagine that affect within the confines of their own cultural and religious norms.

*Bandiri* emerges out of the urban crucible of Kano, northern Nigeria, and the specific historical configuration that creates the conditions for Kano urban experience. In Kano, air routes link the metropolis to Beirut,

Stickers of Sufi  
preachers contest  
with Osama  
bin Laden, Sani  
Abacha, Shah  
Rukh Khan, Tupac  
Shakur, and Ali  
Nuhu for space  
on Kano buses  
and taxis.

Jeddah, Lagos, and London. Stickers of Sufi preachers contest with Osama bin Laden, Sani Abacha, Shah Rukh Khan, Tupac Shakur, and Ali Nuhu for space on Kano buses and taxis.<sup>41</sup> The recent revival of sharia law is contemporaneous with the jump in popularity of gangsta rap and hip-hop available on VCD and satellite television. As an urban center, Kano is the node of overlapping sets of cultural, religious, and economic networks that provide the skeleton around which Kano urban life is built. They provide the raw material that cultural actors use to express identity. Cultural and economic ties to the West are countered by the increasing orientation of Nigerian traders toward the Middle East and Asia, and the pilgrimage to Mecca has become the context for legal and illegal trade as well as for religious observance.

The bricolage of culture inherent in a phenomenon such as *bandiri* is not a free-floating event. It is the fashioning of cultural performance from the availability of cultural forms in a particular given space—urban Kano, Nigeria. Media generate urban form by activating connections in a network, placing Kano Hausawa (Hausa people) into material and immaterial connection with movements and ideas from around the world, making the urban arena “a multiplicity of spaces crosscutting, intersecting or aligning with one another, or existing in relations of paradox or antagonism.”<sup>42</sup> *Bandiri* can be seen as an epiphenomenon of a historical trajectory that brings certain social sets into articulation in the crucible of Kano, creating the historical conditions of possibility from which something like *bandiri* might emerge. Urban possibilities are formed out of the unintended juxtapositions of different sets present in urban space. *Bandiri* music highlights how much Hausa audiences are avid and longtime consumers of a transnational circulation of Indian images and music for which they are the unintended recipients. For forty years an information flow has been persistently diverted off the mainstream of its distribution circuit to other places south of the Sahelian desert. It is there that it rubs up against an Islamic society in the midst of religious revival, and out of that experience a new form of music—*bandiri*—emerges.

## Notes

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1. See, for example, Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Dilip Gaonkar, ed., “Alter/Native Modernities,” special issue, *Public Culture* 11, no. 1 (1999); Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo, *The Anthropology of Globalization* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

2. See Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (London: Longman, 1993); cf. Karin Barber, ed., *Readings in African Popular Culture* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Karin Barber and Christopher Waterman, “Traversing the Global and Local: Fùji Music and Praise Poetry in the Production of Contemporary Yoruba Popular Culture,” in *Worlds Apart: Modernity through the Prism of the Local*, ed. Daniel Miller (London: Routledge), 240–62; Ulf Hannerz, “The World in Creolization,” in Barber, *Readings in African Popular Culture*, 12–18.

3. See Manthia Diawara, “1960s in Bamako: Malick Sidibe and James Brown,” *Black Renaissance/Renaissance Noir* 4 (2002): 59–63.

4. See James Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

5. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald N. Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

6. See Armand Mattelart, *The Invention of Communication*, trans. Susan Emanuel (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Mattelart, *Networking the World, 1794–2000* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

7. See Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, *Telecommunications and the City: Electronic Spaces, Urban Places* (London: Routledge, 1996); Graham and Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities, and the Urban Condition* (London: Routledge, 2002).

8. See David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

9. Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, 86.

10. This approach can be applied to the history of Kano. For example, Kano was an important node of the trans-Sudanic and trans-Saharan trade routes in precolonial times. This trade involved the maintenance of elaborate trading networks, the institution of Hausa as a trading lingua franca, and the cultivation of Islam as a common bond of connection between diverse ethnic groups. Colonial conquest and amalgamation into Nigeria reoriented the Kano economy away from the trans-Saharan trade to the mass production of crops for export to the world market. The building of the Lagos-Kano railway in 1911 decisively oriented Kano south to Lagos; as crops went south, traveling north on the same railways were southern Christian migrants coming to staff the new European companies and colonial bureaucracies. With them came new modes of education, new forms of popular culture, commitments to transnational communities wholly independent of Islam, and a world of cultural and religious difference whose tensions still mark Nigerian political economy to this day.

11. See Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, *The Crimi-*

*nalization of the State in Africa* (Oxford: Currey, 1999); AbdouMaliq Simone, “On the Worlding of African Cities,” *African Studies Review* 44 (2002): 15–41.

12. Brian Larkin, “Indian Films and Nigerian Lovers: Media and the Creation of Parallel Modernities,” *Africa* 67 (1997): 406–40; and Bawuro M. Bar-kinde, “Growing Islamism in Kano City since 1970: Causes, Forms, and Implications,” in *Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Louis Brenner (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 91–105.

13. See Auwalu Anwar, “The Struggle for Influence and Identity: The Ulama in Kano, 1937–1987” (MA thesis, University of Maiduguri, 1989); John N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Ibrahim A. Tahir, “Scholars, Saints, and Capitalists in Kano, 1904–1974: The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society” (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 1975).

14. Sufism is based on the charismatic authority of a founding saint whose knowledge is passed down in a direct line of descent from sheikh to disciple. As orders mature over time, they extend over space, generating dispersed networks linked by common ritual practices, pilgrimage, and education. Kano has long been famous as an economic center of the trans-Saharan and trans-Sudanic trade routes, and there has been a long connection between Sufism and dominant Kano trading families. These families are associated with important Sufi sheikhs, and many have produced their own lineages of distinguished religious scholars. Many scholars have pointed out that the common religious affiliation of particular Sufi orders has been key to the creation of non-kin-based trading networks that rely heavily on credit and trust and that the success of Sufism is an example of the clouding of religious and economic activities (see Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, and Tahir, “Scholars, Saints, and Capitalists in Kano”). In Kano the success of the Sufi order Tijaniyya is strongly linked to its role in producing patron-client networks that are seen as central to the order’s reputation for economic success.

15. Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 60; Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*. For an excellent discussion of the religious organization of *bandiri*, see Malami Buba and Graham Furness, “Youth Culture, *Bandiri*, and the Continuing Legitimacy Debate in Sokoto Town,” *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 12 (1999): 27–46.

16. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change*, 60.

17. See also Buba and Furness, “Youth Culture, *Bandiri*, and the Continuing Legitimacy Debate.”

18. *Ishq* is an Arabic word and consequently has become common in several languages, not the least of which is Hindi, where it is used as a much more everyday term for love—witness the 1997 film *Ishq* (dir. Indra Kumar) starring Amir Khan.

19. Singers do attempt to make money through the commodification of *bandiri* by selling cassettes, but for the most part the material benefit of *bandiri* comes through prestige that can be used within the Sufi network itself. The most prestigious activity, for instance, is to be invited by an important sheikh to perform at *maulud* celebrations that celebrate the birthday of the prophet Muhammad or of important Sufi saints. These celebrations are deeply controversial in Hausa society, as many Wahhabis attack these acts of commemoration as un-Islamic,

despite their role as central rituals in the Sufi calendar. See also Buba and Furniss, “Youth Culture, *Bandiri*, and the Continuing Legitimacy Debate.”

20. Each tape has a brief introduction that reaffirms the religious intent of the cassette and introduces the society and particular singers. I quote here from the opening to the cassette *Ushaq’u Indiya na sha biyu*: “In the name of Allah the most gracious and most merciful, may peace be upon the prophet Muhammad and may God bless him and his family. My relatives, lovers of the Messenger of Allah, we are now going to introduce Ushaq’u India cassette number twelve. The singers are Muhammad Lawan Yaro Magashi, Muhammad Abubakar Baffajo, Marmara Auwalu Iguda Yakasai, Balarabe Musa Kabada, Sani Garba S/K Dan/Dago. Malam Inuwa Bala is the person to beat the drum.”

21. Izala’s full name is Jama’at Izalatil Bid’a wa Iqamatus Sunna—The Movement against Innovation and for a Return to the Sunna. For more on the rise of anti-Sufi Islamist movements, see Barkindo, “Growing Islamism in Kano City,” 91–105; Abubakar Gumi with Ismaila Tsiga, *Where I Stand* (Ibadan: Spectrum, 1992); Ousmane Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Tradition and Reinstatement of Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change*; Muhammad Sani Umar, “Changing Islamic Identity in Nigeria from the 1960s to the 1980s: From Sufism to Anti-Sufism,” in Brenner, *Muslim Identity*, 154–78.

22. Abubakar Gumi, *Aqidah Al-Sahihah Bi Muwafiqah Al-Shari’ah (The Right Belief Is Based on the Sharia)* (Ankara, Turkey: Hilal, 1972).

23. *Ibid.*, 43.

24. *Ibid.*, 142.

25. For example, here is a version of a song by Sidi Musa from the Indian film *Hum Dono (We Two)* (dir. Amarjeet, 1961):

S: Praising Mustapha [a name for the prophet Muhammad] is necessary for us; whoever is against Him, the Prophet is ours.

A: Praising Mustapha is necessary for us; whoever is against Him, the Prophet is ours.

A: Praising Mustapha is necessary for us; whoever is against Him, the Prophet is ours.

26. Brian Larkin, “Indian Films and Nigerian Lovers: Media and the Creation of Parallel Modernities,” in Inda and Rosaldo, *Anthropology and Globalization*, 350–78; Larkin, “Itineraries of Indian Cinema: African Videos, Bollywood, and Global Media,” in *Multiculturalism, Transnationalism, and Film*, ed. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003).

27. See Minou Fugelsang, *Veils and Videos: Female Youth Culture on the Kenyan Coast* (Stockholm: Studies in Social Anthropology, 1994); Heike Behrend, “Love à la Hollywood and Bombay in Kenyan Studio Photography,” *Paideuma* 44 (1998): 139–53.

28. The role of empire as a set to create a common bounded unit is a complex topic that bears examination but is too detailed to go into here. When the British took over northern Nigeria, they brought with them principles of empire that had first been elaborated in the crucible of South Asia. Models of governance, educational ideas, even cinematographic regulations were all imported to Nigeria from India. Certainly, here was a traffic in administrative personnel, modes of bureaucracy, language (English), educational principles, cultural style, fashions, food,

and even forms of ritual such as the famous Hausa *durbar* (*sallah*)—now seen as a “traditional” Hausa festival but imported to Nigeria from India by the British.

29. Larkin, “Indian Films and Nigerian Lovers.”

30. Sani Bashir, interview by the author, Kaduna, Nigeria, November 1996.

31. *Ibid.*

32. For instance, the song by Sidi Musa quoted in note 25 continues:

S: In the name of God I intend to long.

I going to praise my Mustapha.

If they like it or if they don’t like it.

Our Messenger is in front.

Because he is the one that we love—my Mustapha.

A: Praising Mustapha is necessary for us, whoever is against Him, the Prophet is ours.

S: I swear I love you O Sayyadi.

And I love to choose you O Sayyadi,

I love the members of your house O Sayyadi.

And I love the one who loves you.

O my life, O my Muhammad.

See also Regula Burckhardt Qureshi, “Recorded Sound and Religious Music: The Case of Qawwali,” in *Media and the Transformation of Religion in South Asia*, ed. Lawrence A. Babb and Susan S. Wadley (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 139–66.

33. See also Buba and Furniss, “Youth Culture, *Bandiri*, and the Continuing Legitimacy Debate,” 39.

34. Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

35. Meg McLagan provides an interesting discussion of the tension between religious charisma and media celebrity in her article on the resignification of the Dalai Lama in the Tibet movement. See Meg McLagan, “Spectacles of Difference: Cultural Activism and the Mass Mediation of Tibet,” in *Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain*, ed. Faye Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

36. Peter Manuel, *Cassette Culture: Popular Music and Technology in North India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

37. Sudhir Kakar, *Intimate Relations: Exploring Indian Sexuality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

38. *Ibid.*, 26.

39. See Manuel, “Cassette Culture”; Qureshi, “Recorded Sound and Religious Music.”

40. A phrase I take from Ruth Marshall-Fratani’s work on Pentecostalism. See Ruth Marshall-Fratani, “Mediating the Global and Local in Nigerian Pentecostalism,” in *Between Babel and Pentecost: Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America*, ed. André Corten and Ruth Marshall-Fratani (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 80–105.

41. Osama bin Laden is the Islamic leader, Sani Abacha is the former Nigerian military head of state, Shah Rukh Khan is an Indian film star, Tupac Shakur is the U.S. hip-hop artist, and Ali Nuhu is a Hausa video star.

42. Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 3.