

After positing their theory, the authors utilize various statistical models, including logit, survival, and event count analyses, as appropriate, to test their theory, and the results generally comport with their theory. However, perhaps their most important contribution concerns measurement of the dependent variable. The authors use *Shepard's Citations*, a legal citation service detailing how subsequent courts treat prior precedents. Lawyers, judges, and law professors religiously use *Shepard's*; it is a vital tool within the legal community. Although political scientists have employed *Shepard's* more than occasionally, with few exceptions, it has not been used to operationalize dependent judicial variables. Employing *Shepard's* to decipher how courts treat precedent is a legitimate and appropriate use of this citation index, but there has been some trepidation among judicial scholars about applying *Shepard's* in this fashion. While one may quibble with some of the authors' proxies for their independent variables, there should be no doubt regarding the appropriateness of *Shepard's* as a coding mechanism. The authors have demonstrated in convincing detail how *Shepard's* is a reliable and valid measure for this purpose.

The authors have done a commendable job in showing how both law and politics matter when the Supreme Court interprets precedent. Even if scholars are not well versed in utility theory or the empirical methods employed in this book, the authors' uncluttered explanation of the substance of their theory and findings makes *The Politics of Precedent* accessible to any student of the Supreme Court.

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**Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupation** by Alexander Cooley. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2005. 191 pp. \$35.00.

For some time now, countless international relations scholars have scrutinized the anarchic nature of the international system, even though the history of international politics is replete with security and economic arrangements that are hierarchical, that is, that require the curtailment of some freedom of action, and that display different degrees of institutionalization. To be fair, there have been a few sophisticated studies of hierarchy, but Alexander Cooley rightly laments what, for the most part, remains a "caricatured understanding of the politics of hierarchy" (p. xi) and undertakes to remedy this shortcoming.

Drawing on the institutional literature in economics, and particularly such renowned scholars as Alfred Chandler, Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Douglas North, Cooley transfers their work on modern firms, networks, and franchises to the political realm. Much like these economists, he distinguishes between two ideal types of firms: the unitary (U) form (organized along functional lines) and the multidivisional (M) form (organized territorially). He then

persuasively demonstrates how an analysis of political hierarchies based on their organizational form (states, empires, occupations) allows one to identify significant differences in governance, both within hierarchical peripheries and sectors, and across. Or, put differently, Cooley develops a sophisticated conceptual framework of organizational forms in the political realm that allows him to shed light on how hierarchies are organized and how they differ with respect to governance costs, information flow patterns, and types of opportunism.

He then addresses the likelihood of institutional change, thereby introducing a much-welcomed dynamism, and examines what happens after a hierarchy collapses. Whereas peripheral U-form sectors “tend to be reconfigured, change, or collapse” (p. 125), he finds that M-form sectors, for the most part, remain intact.

In a nutshell, there are three reasons sure to secure this thought-provoking book an important place in the political science literature. First, parsimony: simply differentiating between different forms of hierarchy allows Cooley to account for significant variation in political institutions. Second, generalizability: not only does the author examine cases from both the security and economic realms, but the broad geographic scope—Soviet Central Asia, Yugoslavia, Korea, Iraq—makes this study particularly attractive. Third, predictive power: Cooley provides us with the analytical tools to speculate which forms of hierarchy are likely to endure versus which are likely to fall by the wayside, and thereby allows us to generate policy prescriptions of great use to a plethora of transnational actors.

As Cooley makes clear, his firm-type model is not the only way to make sense of hierarchical governance structures in international politics. There are ideational (sociological) and power-based (realist) competitors, yet these are best viewed as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In fact, it is precisely the interdisciplinary nature of Cooley’s approach—borrowing from “the fields of management scholarship, institutional economics, organizational sociology, and political science” (p. 179)—that makes it so appealing.

Last but not least, this timely book promises applicability to current events. As Cooley demonstrates himself, his firm-type model can shed light on recent forms of monetary integration (currency unions, dollarization, currency boards), the rise of tax havens, and credit-rating agencies. It is therefore conceivable that his analytical framework might also be of help to decision makers in the Middle East who are confronted with the difficult task of restoring order and bringing about hierarchical governance structures that will mitigate the effects of anarchy.

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**Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War** by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2005. 288 pp. \$32.95.

Critics of the George W. Bush administration’s justification of the Iraq war as regime change for democracy laud this book. The authors proclaim it not as a